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Abstract
The ‘Major Transitions in Evolution’ (MTE) framework has emerged as the dominant
paradigm for understanding the origins of life’s hierarchical organization, but it has been
criticized on the grounds that it lacks theoretical unity, that is, that the events that
make up the category do not constitute a natural kind. I agree with this criticism, and I
argue that the best response is to modify the category so that it does approximate a
natural kind. Specifically, I recommend defining major transitions as all those, and only
those, events and processes that result in the emergence of a new level of individuality.
Two sorts of changes will be required to achieve this. First, events and processes that do
not meet this criterion, such as the origins of the genetic code and of human language,
should be excluded. Second, events and processes that do meet the criterion, but which
have generally been neglected, should be included. These changes would have the dual
benefits of making MTEs a philosophically coherent category and of increasing the
sample size on which we may infer trends and general principles that may apply to all
MTEs.
Introduction 1
I grew up thinking that Pluto was a planet. In 2006, however, the International 2
Astronomical Union formally defined the word “planet” [1], and because it had failed to 3
“clear the neighborhood” around its orbit, Pluto didn’t make the cut. [2] As a result, 4
textbooks will have to be revised, posters redesigned, museum displays rebuilt...there 5
are real economic costs to this change. Why, then, did they do it? Pluto has changed 6
little since its discovery in 1930. Why couldn’t the IAU leave well enough alone? 7
Humans classify the things we observe. We all agree that celestial bodies, biological 8
organisms, and musical compositions should be sorted into categories, taxa, or genres, 9
but why? One reason is that we think there is value in grouping like things, because 10
doing so allows us to make generalizations. Mammals are warm-blooded and produce 11
milk. Rockabilly combines elements of blues and country music. Planets are roundish, 12
orbit the sun, and clear the neighborhood around their orbit. [1] Generalizing, in turn, 13
allows us to ask questions about the group as a whole, with some hope that the answers 14
will apply to all of its members. Why are mammals warm-blooded? Who were the 15
pioneers of rockabilly? How do planets form? 16
As we discover more things, or more properties of known things, sometimes we 17
have to reconsider the boundaries of a category. Classifications that we thought were 18
discrete and unambiguous turn out to grade into each other and to include marginal 19
cases, requiring refinement or revision of the criteria for inclusion. The discovery of 20
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monotremes, for example, required removing live birth from the criteria for mammals. 21
The discovery of over 1000 Trans-Neptunian Objects required refining the criteria for 22
planets. [1] Genre-straddling musicians spark debates over, for example, whether Lil Nas 23
X’s “Old Town Road” should be ranked on country music charts. [3] 24
The reason, in a nutshell, that the IAU couldn’t leave well enough alone is that 25
the existing classification would have identified all of the trans-Neptunian Objects as 26
planets, and there was no way short of blatant gerrymandering to change the definition 27
to exclude them but include Pluto. So why not just include all of the Trans-Neptunian 28
Objects? Celestial bodies that fail to clear their orbital neighborhoods differ from planets 29
in both their mechanisms of formation and their roles in the orbital mechanics of the 30
solar system. Classifying bodies as planets is useful because it allows us to generalize 31
about these mechanisms and roles and to have some confidence that our generalizations 32
will be true for all planets, including extrasolar planets. Including trans-Neptunian 33
Objects that fail to clear their orbital neighborhoods would invalidate some of these 34
generalizations, making the classification less useful. 35
One of the classifications that has proved useful in biology is that of the so-called 36
‘Major Transitions in Evolution’ (MTE). The MTE framework is an attempt to explain 37
the hierarchical structure of life on Earth: genes within chromosomes, chromosomes 38
within cells, cells within cells (eukaryotic cells), individuals within sexual partnerships, 39
cells within multicellular organisms, and organisms within societies. 40
The best-known effort to unify the origins of these relationships is a book by John 41
Maynard Smith and Eo¨rs Szathma´ry, The Major Transitions in Evolution. [4] First 42
published in 1995, the book focused on the origins of these hierarchical levels, uniting 43
them into a category based on the shared criteria that they change “the way in which 44
genetic information is transmitted between generations,” namely that “. . . entities that 45
were capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of 46
a larger whole after it.” For example, after a transition from unicellular to multicellular 47
organisms (there have been several), cellular reproduction either contributes to the 48
growth of the organism or to production of new multicellular organisms. 49
Rick Michod has revised this idea, focusing less on reproduction and more on units 50
of fitness. [5–7] An edited volume intended to update the Major Transitions framework, 51
including chapters by Szathma´ry [8] and Michod [9] was published in 2011. More recently, 52
Szathma´ry [10] himself has updated the framework he developed with Maynard Smith, 53
removing sex from the list, adding endosymbiotic events, and folding in David Queller’s 54
fraternal/egalitarian distinction (which, incidentally, first appeared in a review of The 55
Major Transitions in Evolution). [11] 56
Thus, the MTE framework has itself evolved, diversifying into several different versions 57
that nevertheless retain some ancestral characters. I will briefly review these variants, 58
focusing on the plesiomorphies that unite them and the apomorphies that distinguish 59
them. I will argue that the most useful definition of an MTE is ‘an evolutionary change 60
that gives rise to a new level of individuality,’ and I will discuss the ambiguities that 61
follow from this definition. I will explore the practical implications of applying this 62
definition and explore ambiguous cases near the margins. Finally, I will summarize what 63
we have learned, and what we still hope to learn, about the shared and unique features 64
of the Major Transitions. 65
The radiation of frameworks 66
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s Major Transitions framework was foreshadowed by a 67
long tradition of viewing life as hierarchically organized and, in some cases, of viewing 68
more inclusive units as having evolved from less inclusive units. August Weismann, 69
for example, recognized that multicellular organisms had evolved from unicellular [12], 70
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and further postulated that cells were made up of groups of molecules that he called 71
biophors. [13] Similarly, Herbert Spencer argued that cells must consist of subcellular 72
components he called physiological units, which were formed by “further compounding 73
of highly compound molecules.” [14, p. 226] William Morton Wheeler extended the 74
hierarchy to include societies of social insects and of humans, both of which he considered 75
real organisms. [15] John Tyler Bonner wrote of “leaps from one level of complexity 76
to the next,” including the origins of life, of eukaryotes, of multicellularity, and of 77
sociality (Table 1). [16] Leo Buss interpreted the hierarchy of life as one of increasingly 78
inclusive units of selection, “species composed of populations, populations of individuals, 79
individuals of cells, cells of organelles, organelles of genomes, genomes of chromosomes, 80
and chromosomes of genes,” and he proposed an evolutionary mechanism for its origin 81
(Table 1). [17, pp. 183-184] 82
The first comprehensive effort to understand these transitions within a unified frame- 83
work, though, was Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s 1995 book The Major Transitions in 84
Evolution (Table 1). [4] This book, and an accompanying paper in Nature [18], attempted 85
to explain the existence of biological units with different levels of complexity as the result 86
of a series of events in which existing units became integrated into new, higher-level 87
units. The most important feature of these events was that “entities that were capable 88
of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger 89
whole after it.” [4, p. 4] Other important features included division of labor among the 90
lower-level units and changes in the way information is transmitted. 91
In his review of The Major Transitions in Evolution, David Queller observed that 92
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s framework included two distinct sorts of transitions, 93
with different initial advantages and eventual outcomes. [11] Fraternal transitions occur 94
among genetically similar units, such as the cells in a multicellular organism or the 95
ants in a colony, and a reproductive division of labor can evolve through kin selection. 96
Egalitarian transitions involve unlike or unrelated units, such as the Archaean and 97
bacterium that combined to form the eukaryotic cell, and although both partners benefit 98
from the alliance, both retain the ability to reproduce. 99
Richard Michod has focused on the subset of the major transitions that, in his view, 100
result in a new unit of selection, including those “from individual genes to networks of 101
genes, from gene networks to bacteria-like cells, from bacteria-like cells to eukaryotic 102
cells with organelles, from cells to multicellular organisms, and from solitary organisms 103
to societies” (Table 1). [6, p. 7] His more recent works also include the origins of sexual 104
reproduction. [9] Michod’s focus on units of selection is consistent with the views of 105
Buss [17, pp. 183-184] but narrower than that of Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, who 106
acknowledged that some, but not all, of their major transitions involved a change in 107
the units of evolution; for example, the origin of the genetic code does not fit this 108
scheme [4, p. 12]. In accordance with this narrower focus, Michod prefers to call the 109
transitions in his framework evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETIs) rather than 110
major transitions. [5–7,9] 111
In 2011, Brett Calcott and Kim Sterelny published an edited volume, The Major 112
Transitions in Evolution Revisited, with a diverse set of perspectives. [19] Several of the 113
authors accepted Michod’s view either explicitly or implicitly (by only considering the 114
subset of the major transitions that are also transitions in individuality). [9,20,21] Others 115
advocated expanding the framework to include, for example, the endosymbiotic origins 116
of plastids [8,22], the Cambrian explosion [23], the mutualistic association between corals 117
and zooxanthellae [22], and other evolutionary innovations within the metazoa [8]. 118
Twenty years after the publication of The Major Transitions in Evolution, Szathma´ry 119
revisited the topic, presenting his conception for a “Major evolutionary transitions 120
theory 2.0” (Table 1). [10] He advocated two major changes: the removal of sex and 121
the inclusion of plastid acquisition. Sex, he argued, was best viewed not as a separate 122
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major transition, but “as a coevolving form of maintenance or transformation of an 123
emerging higher-level evolutionary unit,” namely the eukaryotic cell. [10, p. 10108] 124
Since plastids are now understood to result from endosymbiotic events analogous to the 125
acquisition of the mitochondrion, Szathma´ry argued for the inclusion of both primary 126
and recursive (secondary, tertiary, and quaternary) plastid acquisition events within the 127
major transitions framework. 128
Table 1. A partial list of versions of the major transitions or transitions in individuality framework. This is
not intended to be a comprehensive list, but a sampling of works that have attempted to present or revise a
framework for the evolution of life’s hierarchical structure. [4, 9, 10,16,17,24,25]
Origin of...
Bonner
1974
Buss
1987
Maynard
Smith &
Szathma´ry
1995
Michod
2011
Bourke
2011
Szathma´ry
2015
West
et al.
2015
This work
Eukaryotes X X X X X X X X
Multicellularity X X X X X X X X
Eusociality X X X X X X X X
Protocells/life X X X X X X X
Chromosomes X X X X X X
Sex X X X X
Language/memes X X X
Genetic code X X
Plastids X X X
Mutualisms X X X
Colonial animals X X X
Natural kinds 129
There is something philosophically muddled and scientifically casual about 130
[the major transitions framework]...The fault has been the yielding to theo- 131
retical inconsistency. Enough is enough. [26, p. 32] 132
From the beginning, the major transitions framework has been criticized for lumping 133
together dissimilar events. Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry acknowledged that their 134
list was somewhat arbitrary [4], and Queller, in his review of The Major Transitions, 135
suggested that it was really two books, one describing changes in the mechanisms of 136
inheritance and one addressing the evolution of cooperation. [11] In their chapter in 137
The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited, Daniel McShea and Carl Simpson argued 138
that Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s list of major transitions lacks theoretical unity 139
and needs to be revised. [26] Michod, in the same volume, defended his shorter list of 140
transitions in individuality on the grounds that, unlike Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s 141
list, his constituted a natural kind (a category whose members share fundamental 142
similarities). [9] More recently, O’Malley and Powell pointed out that both the original 143
and revised forms of the major transitions framework fail as natural kinds, shoehorning 144
in events that fail to meet any common set of criteria and failing to include some events 145
that do. [27] 146
I agree with McShea and Simpson: enough is enough. To be most useful, the MTE 147
framework should be modified so that the events and processes included approximate a 148
natural kind. As the IAU did with planets, we should define the qualifications, then 149
include or exclude particular examples based on the degree to which those qualifica- 150
tions are met. The criterion that comes closest to current and historical usage is ‘an 151
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evolutionary change that gives rise to a new level of individuality.’ This is consistent 152
with Buss’s emergence of new levels of selection [17], since most evolutionary concepts 153
of individuality revolve around units of selection or of adaptation. [11, 20, 28–33] It does 154
not apply to all of Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s transitions (as they acknowledge), 155
but it does apply to those that meet the criterion they considered most important, the 156
shift from independent to group replication [4] and is consistent with Maynard Smith’s 157
earlier work on the topic. [34] It is also the criterion explicitly advocated by Michod and 158
colleagues [5–7,9] and by West et al. [25]. Even Szathma´ry seems to have recently come 159
around to viewing major transitions as transitions in individuality. [35] 160
Applying the definition 161
Each polypus, though closely united to its brethren, has a distinct mouth, 162
body, and tentacula. Of these polypi, in a large specimen, there must be 163
many thousands; yet we see that they act by one movement; that they have 164
one central axis connected with a system of obscure circulation; and that the 165
ova are produced in an organ distinct from the separate individuals. Well 166
may one be allowed to ask, what is an individual? [36, p. 117], referring to a 167
colonial cnidarian sea pen. 168
Having chosen a criterion, we should apply it consistently. Two kinds of changes will 169
be needed. First, events and processes that don’t fit the criterion of resulting in a 170
new level of individuality should be ruthlessly pruned. The most obvious candidate for 171
expulsion is the origin of the genetic code. The fact that this transition is rarely discussed 172
in the MTE framework constitutes an implicit acknowledgement of its poor fit, and 173
various authors have pointed out explicitly that it does not belong. [9, 25,27] Similarly, 174
the origin of language has been largely absent from discussions of major transitions, 175
and several authors have argued that it should be excluded for the sake of theoretical 176
consistency. [9,25–27] Neither innovation meets what Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 177
themselves identify as their most important criterion, the shift from independent to 178
group replication. [4] Two of these things are not like the others; let us follow the IAU’s 179
example and excise that which does not belong. 180
Surprisingly, several recent proposals have gone the opposite direction. Various 181
modifications have been proposed that would, if implemented, exacerbate the lack of 182
theoretical unity by adding evolutionary changes that have very little in common with 183
the transitions traditionally included within the MTE framework. Proposed additions 184
include the origin of oxygenic photosynthesis and the resulting oxygenation of the 185
Earth’s atmosphere [8, 27]; the origin of a nervous system in animals [37]; the Cambrian 186
Explosion [23]; the origin of closed circulation systems in vertebrates, annelids, and 187
cephalopods [8]; the origin of a rigid cell wall [8]; the origin of an exoskeleton in 188
Ecdysozoa [8]; and the origin of the immune system. [8] 189
All of these proposed additions are undoubtedly important evolutionary events, 190
but none of them belong in the MTE framework. They don’t meet Buss’s criteria of 191
transitions between units of selection [17, p. viii], Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s of 192
independently replicating entities shifting to group replication [4], or Michod’s of the 193
emergence of new evolutionary individuals. [5–7,9] Adding the origins photosynthesis, 194
nervous systems, cell walls, etc. to the MTE framework is analogous to expanding the 195
definition of planets to include not only trans-Neptunian objects but comets, asteroids, 196
and moons as well. 197
The justification for most of the proposed additions is their outsized effects on 198
the biosphere and on subsequent evolutionary processes. Importance, though, is a 199
lousy criterion for grouping evolutionary processes. The MTE framework is a part 200
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of evolutionary theory in the same way that behavioral ecology, quantitative genetics, 201
evo-devo, and inclusive fitness are parts of evolutionary theory. Each seeks to explain 202
some aspect of biology and includes within its purview all of the relevant examples 203
without regard for the magnitude of their effect. Behavioral ecology does not exclude 204
behaviors unique to a single species, nor does evo-devo exclude monotreme development 205
because monotremes have not experienced a large adaptive radiation. In each case, the 206
fit of a particular process to a subfield is a matter of similarity to other processes in the 207
same subfield, not of perceived importance. 208
Importance is a lousy criterion because it is based on outcomes, not on fundamental 209
similarities. Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s list was not intended to be a list of the 210
most important evolutionary changes (in spite of the title of their book). In fact, they 211
specifically exclude consideration of such ”major phenotypic changes” as terrestrialization 212
and the origins of vision, flight, and homeothermy. [4] The framework that explains 213
processes as diverse as the evolution of multicellularity, of nervous systems, and of 214
cell walls might be best described as ‘evolutionary biology’; no smaller category will 215
suffice. Aside from preventing theoretical unity, using importance as a criterion precludes 216
consideration of recent or in-progress transitions, the eventual importance of which we 217
can’t yet evaluate. 218
The second kind of change that will be needed to make the MTE framework approxi- 219
mate a natural kind is to include events and processes that meet the criteria of resulting 220
in a new level of individuality, but which have generally been ignored. Some such 221
additions have already been suggested. For example, the endosymbiosis of a cyanobac- 222
terium that resulted in the primary acquisition of a chloroplast, and secondary and 223
higher-order acquisitions of eukaryotic algae, are egalitarian transitions that parallel the 224
endosymbiotic origin of mitochondria. Although they have been relatively neglected in 225
the MTE literature, several authors have pointed out that they belong. [10,24,27,38,39] 226
The relatively recent domestication of a cyanobacterium by the filose amoeba Paulinella, 227
which may represent a second origin of a primary chloroplast, has also been nominated 228
for inclusion. [10,40] 229
Other kinds of multispecies coalitions have also been proposed for inclusion in the MTE 230
framework. Benjamin Kerr and Joshua Nahum, for example, argue that the association 231
between corals and single-celled algae called zooxanthellae qualifies. [22] Andrew Bourke 232
and Szathma´ry both consider the origins of lichens as major transitions [10, 24], and 233
Szathma´ry also includes the Buchnera-aphid symbiosis within his ’Major Transitions 234
2.0’. [10] 235
Symbiotic associations occupy a spectrum of degrees of intimacy from casual to 236
mitochondria. Which of these qualify as a composite individual, or holobiont, will 237
undoubtedly differ among readers. Most would, I think, agree that free-living protists, 238
with their bacterial and archaeal components, qualify; few would, I think, extend that 239
to oxpeckers and wildebeest. In between, there is a range of associations that may or 240
may not constitute major transitions. What I am advocating is a standard by which we 241
can judge: does the association constitute a composite individual? If so, it should be 242
included within the MTE framework. 243
Among the fraternal transitions, the most egregious oversight is the exclusion of 244
colonial animals, such as marine invertebrates within the zoantharian and anthozoan 245
corals, hydrozoans, bryozoans, graptolites, and ascidians. Many have differentiated 246
zooids, some even with reproductive specialization, a striking parallel to differentiated 247
cells in multicellular organisms. Buss hints that he does consider such ’metameric 248
organisms’ to constitute a new level of selection [17, p. 195], and Bourke argues explicitly 249
for their inclusion. [24] As with the putative egalitarian transitions discussed above, 250
the question of whether or not a coral or graptolite colony is the outcome of a major 251
transition hinges on whether or not it qualifies as an individual. The most integrated of 252
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these, for example Portuguese man o’ war, certainly do. 253
Ambiguities 254
We designate something as an organism, not because it is n steps up on the 255
ladder of life, but because it is a consolidated unit of design, the focal point 256
where lines of adaptation converge. It is where history has conspired to make 257
between-unit selection efficacious and within-unit selection impotent. [11, p. 258
187] 259
I do not imagine or intend that this essay will end disagreements about what processes 260
belong in the MTE framework. I have advocated for an explicit criterion—those that 261
result in a new level of individuality—but that, of course, raises a new problem: what 262
constitutes a new level of individuality? This in turn raises the question of what is an 263
individual, about which too much has been written to review here. 264
Since the MTE framework, in any version, is a set of questions about evolutionary 265
processes, an evolutionary concept of individuality is the most relevant. The concept 266
of individuality that has been embraced by most MTE authors is that of units of 267
selection. [41,42] Buss [17], Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry [4], Michod [5], Szathma´ry [10], 268
and West and colleagues [25], among many others, have all employed some form of this 269
criterion. 270
Even if we agree that a major transition is an evolutionary process that results in 271
a new unit of selection, we will still be left with marginal cases. Individuality comes 272
in degrees, and any line we draw will be arbitrary [20,43,44]. In fact, since most such 273
transitions probably play out over geological time scales, while we can generally only 274
see a snapshot, we should expect to see many incomplete transitions at any given time. 275
These may be on their way to a complete transition, or they may be stable arrangements 276
in their own right. [44] 277
Intermediate cases, in which a new level of individuality has partially or debatably 278
emerged, should be part of the MTE conversation. They are our best window into the 279
processes and intermediate states that occur during a major transition. When we look 280
at only the ends of a spectrum, we may miss the middle, which is where the interesting 281
stuff is happening. 282
Let’s talk about sex 283
[S]ex requires the coordination of two individuals, and, so implies the existence 284
of a higher-level unit, the reproductive pair...Though I argue that viewing 285
sex as an ETI may help integrate different perspectives on the problem of 286
the evolution of sex, there are several senses in which the evolution of sex is 287
not an ETI in the same sense as, say, multicellularity. [9, p. 186] 288
I have so far largely ignored one of Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s [4] transitions, that 289
from asexual to sexual populations. Whether or not the origin of sex should be included 290
within the MTE framework is a more difficult question than those I considered in the 291
previous sections. The origins of the genetic code and of language are clearly not origins 292
of new levels of individuality. The origins of plastids and other endosymbionts, of lichens, 293
and of colonial marine invertebrates clearly are. 294
The evolution of eukaryotic sex was one of Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry’s major 295
transitions. [4] Michod generally includes it within his evolutionary transitions in individ- 296
uality, though he admits that there are important differences between sex and other such 297
transitions. [9] Bourke also includes sex as a transition in individuality. [24] On the other 298
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hand, Queller pointed out the poor fit of sex within the major transitions framework [11], 299
Szathma´ry demoted it to an subprocess within the evolution of eukaryotes [10], and 300
West and colleagues excluded it altogether. [25] 301
The evolution of sex has some fundamental similarities to that of eukaryotes, multi- 302
cellularity, and eusociality, but important differences from these processes as well. But 303
viewing major transitions in the way I advocate gives us a grip on the question. Whether 304
or not sex belongs in the major transitions framework should be decided on the same 305
basis as other transitions: does it result in a new unit of selection? 306
My assessment is that in most cases, it does not. In the view I have outlined here, 307
sex would be a major transition if the mated pair constitutes a unit of selection. Indeed, 308
these are the grounds on which Michod [9, p. 186] justifies viewing sex as an ETI: 309
”...fitness is a property of the reproductive pair, not of individual organisms. In this 310
sense, the reproductive pair is the real evolutionary individual in obligate sexual species.” 311
It is true that the members of a mated pair often cooperate. But is the mated 312
pair an evolutionary individual in the sense of a unit of selection? Each has its own 313
genetic interest, namely to increase the representation of the alleles it carries in future 314
generations. These different interests cause conflicts, both intra- and interlocus, and in 315
some cases these conflicts are so severe as to be fatal. [45] Often each partner has its own 316
preference regarding how often and with whom the other mates, and arms races occur 317
in an escalating contest to enforce (or escape enforcement of) these preferences. [45] 318
Even in cases of strict genetic monogamy, each partner has a different optimal level of 319
resource investment, which manifests as conflicts over such things as clutch size and 320
parental care. 321
Perhaps the strongest argument against viewing the mated pair as a unit of selection 322
is that the members’ fitnesses are not generally the same. Although their fecundities are 323
certainly linked, they are only likely to be equal in cases of strict genetic monogamy. 324
Worse, their viabilities are, in most cases, quite independent, since the death of one does 325
not imply the death of the other. 326
The best example supporting the view of sex as an MTE is probably cases of so-called 327
”sexual parasites” as found in some anglerfish. [46] In such cases, the male may be a 328
half million times smaller than the female, with whom he permanently fuses, eventually 329
devolving to little more than a gonad. Even so, the male and female retain separate 330
reproductive interests, as the female often multiply mates [47], while the male would 331
surely prefer an exclusive partnership in which he fertilizes all of the female’s eggs. Thus, 332
even in the best case scenario, the mated pair is a poor candidate for individuality, 333
undermining the case for including sex in the MTE framework. 334
The payoff: common themes 335
There is sufficient formal similarity between the various transitions to hold 336
out the hope that progress in understanding any one of them will help 337
illuminate the others. [18, p. 23] 338
Rocky planets are generally thought to form inside, and gas giants outside, the snow 339
line (the distance from the central protostar at which water condensation becomes 340
possible). [48] Trans-Neptunian objects (including Pluto) do not fit this generalization, 341
because they formed through fundamentally different processes. [49] If current models 342
of planetary formation are correct, we can expect to find exoplanets dominated by 343
rocky planets inside, and gas giants outside, their systems’ snow lines. A contrary 344
finding would imply that planetary migration is common, that snow lines frequently 345
move, or that current models are wrong. [50] By choosing objective criteria and applying 346
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them consistently, the IAU has made planets something like a natural kind, allowing 347
meaningful generalizations and increasing the utility of the category. 348
Similarly, if we define MTEs as something like a natural kind, we can hope to fulfill 349
Szathma´ry and Maynard Smith’s [18] vision by finding principles that apply across 350
levels of organization, from chromosomes to societies. Some of these principles have 351
already been inferred, for example that cooperation among the lower-level units plays 352
an important role in the emergence of a higher-level individual and that such transitions 353
often lead to division of labor among the lower-level units. [4] If these principles truly are 354
general, we can expect that they will hold wherever life exists. A contrary finding would 355
force a revision of our models of major transitions, or at least a narrowing of their scope. 356
Defining MTEs this way allows us to ask questions about the processes and outcomes 357
of major transitions that are not possible if those processes and outcomes are treated 358
as criteria. Is cooperation among the lower-level units always necessary? Under what 359
conditions do major transitions lead to division of labor? How consistently, and in what 360
sense, do major transitions involve a change in the mechanism of inheritance? 361
By excluding criteria based on importance, we can also ask meaningful questions 362
about the outcomes of major transitions. What are the factors that determine whether 363
or not a major transition leads to a large adaptive radiation, or to biosphere-altering 364
ecological effects? These questions are rendered meaningless if large adaptive radiations 365
and biosphere-altering effects are qualifications for major transitions, just as using ‘has 366
a biosphere’ as a criterion for a celestial body to qualify as a planet would render 367
meaningless questions about what kinds of planets can support life. We can only answer 368
such questions by comparing transitions that have had important consequences with 369
those that have not. 370
Including ’minor’ major transitions (to borrow Grosberg and Strathmann’s [51] 371
terminology) also has the benefit of increasing sample size. In our search for trends 372
and general principles, we now have access to a census (at least of known cases) instead 373
of a biased sample. By examining similar processes, regardless of their outcomes, we 374
can potentially learn about watershed transitions whose origins have been obscured 375
by the eons, for example about the primary origin of chloroplasts from subsequent 376
endosymbioses between heterotrophs and photoautotrophs. [52,53] What might we learn 377
about intracellular symbioses by considering not only the origin of eukaryotes but of 378
primary and higher-order plastids, insect endosymbionts (and endo-endosymbionts [54]), 379
and algal cells that harbor Rickettsial bacteria [55]? What might we learn about 380
clonal multicellularity from the spondylomoracean green alga Pyrobotrys [56], colonial 381
choanoflagellates [57], and multicellular ciliates such as Zoothamnium, or about societies 382
from bryophytes, graptolites, and corals? 383
Objections 384
The question can justifiably be raised whether we have a theory or not. I 385
think we do, but with qualifications. [10, p. 10110] 386
Though they won’t match the outcry over Pluto’s exclusion, I expect that objections 387
will be raised against the revision I have proposed. In this section, I will attempt to 388
answer some that have already been raised and some that seem obvious. 389
Fraternal and egalitarian transitions [11] are fundamentally different pro- 390
cesses. This is true, but they also have important characteristics in common, and 391
historically both have been included in every version of the MTE framework (Table 1). 392
Fraternal and egalitarian are useful subcategories within the larger category of major 393
transitions, just as rocky and gas giant are useful subcategories within the larger category 394
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of planets. Both contribute to our understanding of the origins of life’s hierarchical 395
organization. 396
Viewing MTEs as transitions in individuality still lumps unique, one-off 397
transitions with repeated, somewhat predictable events. [27] This too is true: 398
some major transitions, such as the origins of multicellularity, have happened many 399
times, while others, such as the endosymbiotic origin of eukaryotes, are unique. I don’t 400
see this as a problem. First of all, we don’t know which events are, as O’Malley and 401
Powell put it, “non-replicable, one-off events.” [27, p. 163] The origin of eukaryotes 402
is an obvious candidate, but we don’t actually know that, if it hadn’t happened in 403
the Lokiarchaeota, something like eukaryotes would not have arisen elsewhere in the 404
tree of life. Even if some of the transitions truly are non-replicable, though, this does 405
not threaten the coherence of the category. Evolution, after all, is a combination of 406
repeatable and contingent events. 407
Limiting MTEs to transitions in individuality excludes many events of fun- 408
damental importance to evolutionary processes and to the biosphere. [27,58] 409
Furthermore, including all of the transitions that result in a new level of individuality 410
would mean including some events that have not (yet) had major evolutionary conse- 411
quences. [27] These are only disadvantages if we think important consequences should 412
be one of the criteria. I have explained in the previous sections why I think importance 413
is better treated as an outcome than as a criterion. Having major consequences is surely 414
contingent, and we can’t say which recent transitions in individuality might have major 415
consequences in the future. Furthermore, some events without major consequences 416
have traditionally been included within the MTE framework, for example origins of 417
multicellularity that have not led to major adaptive radiations or biosphere-altering 418
ecological impacts, such as the volvocine algae. 419
Even in its revised form, the MTE framework remains progressivist, en- 420
couraging a ‘monads to man’ view of evolution. [27, 58] If this is true, it is an 421
argument about how we should interpret the MTE framework, not about how we should 422
define it. There is nothing inherently progressivist in recognizing that in some lineages, at 423
some times, complexity, in the sense of the number of hierarchically nested levels [?, 59], 424
has increased. This is simply true. As Maynard Smith and Sza´thmary put it, ”...there is 425
surely some sense in which elephants and oak trees are more complex than bacteria, and 426
bacteria than the first replicating molecules.” [4, p. 23] A claim that such increases are 427
universal or inevitable would be progressivist, but I am unfamiliar with any such claim 428
in the peer-reviewed literature. Furthermore, in the view I advocate, humans occupy no 429
privileged position, and the vast majority of MTEs—most endosymbiotic events, most 430
origins of multicellularity, all origins of eusociality—did not lead to humans. If there is a 431
‘highest’ level (again, in terms of number of nested levels within), it would be that of 432
quaking aspen groves, of eusocial insects and colonial marine invertebrates, of quaternary 433
endosymbiosis-derived dinoflagellates, or possibly of ant ‘supercolonies’. [?] 434
Conclusions 435
At the heart of my arguments is the simple observation that the history 436
of life is a history of the elaboration of new self-replicating entities by the 437
self-replicating entities contained within them (or the incorporation of some 438
self-replicating entities by others). [17, p. vii] 439
I take the purpose of the major transitions framework to be explaining the hierarchical 440
organization of life on Earth: societies made up of organisms, which are in turn made 441
up of cells, cells within cells, and so on. [6,17,21,24,60] Each level of the hierarchy, from 442
chromosomes to superorganisms, has or is thought to have emerged from components 443
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that were previously evolutionary individuals in their own right. I advocate including 444
within the major transitions framework all those, and only those, events and processes 445
in which a new level of individuality has emerged. Applying this criterion consistently 446
would make the major transitions framework philosophically coherent, something like 447
a natural kind. By including events and processes that have mostly been neglected, it 448
would also increase the number of events from which we can draw inferences. 449
We do need a theoretical framework to explain other events of momentous consequence, 450
such as the origin of the genetic code, the Cambrian explosion, the biotic oxygenation of 451
Earth’s atmosphere, and the origins of powered flight. Thankfully, such a framework 452
exists. We could call it macroevolution, or simply evolutionary biology. No smaller 453
category can hope to both explain such a wide variety of events and retain a semblance 454
of coherence. 455
The course I advocate is a minimal intervention and much less invasive than other 456
proposed treatments. Biologists and philosophers who write about the MTE framework, 457
particularly those who seek general principles, have, by and large, already converged 458
on something like the definition I advocate. In some cases this has been explicit; 459
in others the authors have simply ignored MTEs that do not result in new levels of 460
individuality. [20,21,24,25,35,59,60] In fact, aside from their inclusion by Maynard Smith 461
and Szathmary [4], the origins of the genetic code and language have played virtually no 462
role in the development of the MTE framework, probably because there is nothing to 463
be gained by their inclusion. The impracticality of including fundamentally different 464
processes has, in other words, already driven the field toward adopting a coherent 465
category. Recent proposals to include additional unrelated processes would reverse this 466
trend, radically redefining the MTE framework into something unrecognizable and less 467
useful. [24, 61]. 468
There is no equivalent of the IAU for evolutionary biology, no final authority to 469
impose a definition on the field. Definitions are not right or wrong anyway, but more or 470
less useful. I have argued for a particular definition of major transitions on the grounds 471
that it closely approximates a natural kind, making it more useful than less coherent 472
definitions. Having a clear criterion will allow us to objectively evaluate whether a 473
particular process or event constitutes a major transition, and grouping like processes 474
and events will allow us to identify trends and general principles that may be true for all. 475
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